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This paper focuses on key ways in which donors can improve the quality of foreign assistance and 
make it more effective in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  The paper makes 
three central arguments. First, donors should be much more goal and results oriented in their 
assistance programs, and should work with low-income countries to ensure that poverty reduction 
strategies (PRSs) have specific, well-defined goals both in the short-run and long-run. PRSs should 
be expected to specifically refer to the MDGs, even if governments choose to adopt goals that do 
not exactly coincide with the MDGs.  PRSs should provide both a "baseline scenario" with targets 
consistent with the most likely policy changes and levels of financing and a "high achievement" 
scenario with much more ambitious targets which lays out the additional policy, institutional, and 
financing changes needed to reach these goals. Second, donors must go beyond the rhetoric of 
"country selectivity" and actually begin to allocate aid more seriously to poorer countries with 
strong and moderate governance.  Although there has been some improvement in aid allocation in 
recent years, much more can be done.  Donors should establish basic rules for allocating aid based 
on the extent of poverty and the quality of governance, not to be dogmatic and rigid, but to 
provide some defenses against other forces that push aid allocations towards political and 
commercial considerations.  Third, country selectivity should be conceived as much more than 
simply allocating more money to countries with stronger governance: it should change the way 
donors deliver aid to different countries.  Well-governed countries should have a much greater say 
in designing aid programs, should receive more of their aid as program funding, and should 
receive longer-term commitments from the donor community. In these countries, foreign 
assistance should finance a broader set of activities, with most (but not all) of the funding 
channeled through the recipient government. Poorly governed countries should not only receive 
less money, they should receive more of it as project aid, it should come with a shorter time 
commitment, should be focused on a narrower set of activities, and much of it should be 
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This paper focuses on key ways in which donors can improve the quality of foreign assistance and make 
it more effective in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  The paper makes three 
central arguments. First, donors should be much more goal and results oriented in their assistance 
programs, and should work with low-income countries to ensure that poverty reduction strategies 
(PRSs) have specific, well-defined goals both in the short-run and long-run. PRSs should be expected to 
specifically refer to the MDGs, even if governments choose to adopt goals that do not exactly coincide 
with the MDGs.  PRSs should provide both a "baseline scenario" with targets consistent with the most 
likely policy changes and levels of financing and a "high achievement" scenario with much more 
ambitious targets which lays out the additional policy, institutional, and financing changes needed to 
reach these goals. Second, donors must go beyond the rhetoric of "country selectivity" and actually 
begin to allocate aid more seriously to poorer countries with strong and moderate governance.  Although 
there has been some improvement in aid allocation in recent years, much more can be done.  Donors 
should establish basic rules for allocating aid based on the extent of poverty and the quality of 
governance, not to be dogmatic and rigid, but to provide some defenses against other forces that push 
aid allocations towards political and commercial considerations.  Third, country selectivity should be 
conceived as much more than simply allocating more money to countries with stronger governance: it 
should change the way donors deliver aid to different countries.  Well-governed countries should have a 
much greater say in designing aid programs, should receive more of their aid as program funding, and 
should receive longer-term commitments from the donor community. In these countries, foreign 
assistance should finance a broader set of activities, with most (but not all) of the funding channeled 
through the recipient government. Poorly governed countries should not only receive less money, they 
should receive more of it as project aid, it should come with a shorter time commitment, should be 
focused on a narrower set of activities, and much of it should be distributed through NGOs.  
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The Monterrey Consensus signaled a new partnership between rich and poor countries aimed at 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  The agreement, adopted by heads of state at 
the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2001, 
contains commitments by all countries for specific actions to help low-income countries achieve the 
MDGs.
2  The Consensus recognizes that the main responsibility for accelerating development lies with 
the governments of poor countries themselves, which must put in place appropriate policy and 
institutional frameworks and make the sometimes difficult decisions necessary to ensure full 
implementation.  It also acknowledges that poor countries themselves cannot achieve the goals, or even 
make significant progress towards them, without the cooperation and assistance of the international 
community. Accordingly, the industrialized countries committed to taking steps in a range of areas, 
including trade (especially in improving market access and reducing agricultural subsidies), investment, 
debt relief, and official development assistance (ODA). 
 
Donor commitments at Monterrey on ODA came in two parts.  First, donors committed to increasing the 
quantity of aid.  The Consensus reaffirmed the international community’s goal, first made in the late 
1960s, of ODA flows reaching 0.7% of donor GNP.  Specifically, the heads of state agreed to “urge 
developed countries that have not done so to make concrete efforts towards the target of 0.7% of gross 
national product (GNP) as ODA to developing countries” (paragraph 42).   Second, donors committed to 
improving the quality of aid.  The Consensus acknowledges that donors must significantly improve the 
way they deliver aid to make it more effective.  Towards this end, it calls on donors (in paragraph 43) to 
make greater efforts to harmonize their operational procedures, make further progress in untying aid, use 
budget support mechanisms where appropriate, adopt development frameworks that are owned and 
driven by developing countries, target a greater share of aid to the poor, and improve the measurement 
of results. 
 
This paper focuses on key ways in which donors can improve the quality of aid and make it more 
effective in achieving the MDGs.  It briefly reviews, but does not focus primarily on, the quantity of 
funding that will be necessary to achieve the MDGs, since that critical issue is being studied elsewhere.  
I make three central arguments.   
 
First, donors must be much more goal and results oriented in their ODA programs.  Clear goals are 
important for both the recipient and the donor.  Recipients should set specific, measurable goals in their 
poverty reduction strategies (PRSs), and these goals should be set with direct reference to the MDGs.  
Goals need not necessarily precisely replicate the MDGs, but the PRSs should compare national goals 
with the MDGs and explain any significant differences.  PRSs should lay out a baseline set of 
operational targets for the short run and medium run that are consistent with the most likely policy 
changes, institutional capacity, and donor funding.  But they should also lay out a more ambitious 
framework consistent with fully achieving the MDGs (or similar national goals), and detail the changes 
in domestic policies, foreign policies (such as trade access) institutions, and foreign financing that will 
be needed to meet these more ambitious targets. 
 
Second, donors must further improve the allocation of ODA to better achieve the MDGs.  There has 
been some halting progress in this direction in recent years, with more aid being allocated to poorer 
countries with better governance and a stronger commitment to development.  But much more progress 
is required in this regard, including the need to allocate additional funds to countries that are vulnerable 
to periodic economic shocks, and to those emerging from conflict. 
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Third, donors should better align the ways they deliver aid with the realities on the ground in 
different kinds of recipient countries.  “Country selectivity” should mean more than donors simply 
allocating more ODA to well-governed countries.  Aid delivery mechanisms should differ significantly 
between well-governed and poorly governed countries.  For example, in well-governed countries donors 
should provide most of their aid as long-term commitments for budget support to the central 
government, whereas in poorly governed countries, smaller, shorter-term projects implemented by non-
government organizations (NGOs) are more appropriate.  Donors must hone much more differentiated 
strategies to match the particular circumstances of the recipient, some of which will require significant 
shifts in donor organizations. 
 
There are a range of other important issues affecting aid effectiveness that I do not touch on here.  These 
include donor choices on allocating funds between bilateral and multilateral organizations, the debate 
about "horizontal" versus "vertical" funding mechanisms, grants versus loans, tied aid, and donor 
harmonization.  While each of these is an important topic, they are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
2002 Global ODA Levels – One Year After Monterrey 
 
In 2002, global ODA flows totaled $58.3 billion, up a significant 11% from $52.3 billion in 2001 (Table 
1).  Part of this increase is due to the weakening of the dollar and inflation.  In real terms (keeping 
constant 2001 prices and exchange rates), the 2002 figure was $56.1 billion, an increase of 7.2%. This 
change represents the largest increase in ODA (in real terms) since 1998, and it returns global ODA to 
the nominal level reached in 1991-92.  Several countries increased the size of their ODA disbursements 
significantly: Canada and Italy by over 30% in real terms (shown in column f); Greece, Ireland and 
France by over 20% each, and Belgium and the United States by about 15% each.  The United States 
made the largest increase in absolute dollar terms of $1.9 billion, with France increasing its 
disbursements by over $1 billion.  The increases in global ODA were perhaps partly in response to the 
agreements forged in the Monterrey Consensus, although a large part of the increase, especially from the 
U.S., was aid to allies in response to the war on terror.
3  At the same time, several countries decreased 
their ODA budgets, including Austria, Denmark, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland.   
 
In terms of ODA as a share of donor GNI,
4 Denmark remains at the top of the pack with disbursements 
equal to 0.96% of its GNI.  Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg all contribute more 
than the internationally agreed upon target of 0.7% of GNI.  The United States remains at the bottom of 
the list in this regard, with ODA at only 0.13% of GNI, up slightly from the 2001 level.  The U.S. is now 
the only DAC country with ODA disbursements less than 0.20% of GNI.  For the DAC as a whole, 
ODA disbursements in 2002 were the equivalent of 0.23% of GNI. 
 
Increasing ODA to the international target of 0.7% of GNI would represent a tripling of the 2002 level 
of 0.23% of GNI, i.e., and additional approximately $110 billion.  However, the target of 0.7% was set 
rather arbitrarily several decades ago.  While there is no doubt that a significant increase in aid (along 
                                                 
3 Note that the two new high profile U.S. ODA programs – the Millennium Challenge Account and the Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief – will not disburse any money until 2004, so they are not responsible for the increase in U.S. ODA in 2002.  The 
largest part of the increase in U.S. ODA was disbursements to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Jordan and several other countries 
involved in the war on terror. 
4 The Monterrey Consensus referred to ODA in terms of donor Gross National Product (GNP), while aid statistics normally 
are reported as a share of donor Gross National Income (GNI).  The two terms can be used interchangeably.   4
with several other things) will be necessary for low-income countries to achieve the MDGs, it is not 
clear that 0.7% will be necessary. 
 
Two independent estimates have been made of the amount of ODA needed to achieve the MDGs.  The 
first was by the UN-commissioned High-Level Panel on Financing for Development (UN, 2001).  This 
panel, chaired by former President of Mexico Ernesto Zedillo, estimated that an additional $50 billion in 
additional ODA per year would be required to achieve the MDGs.  The second, by World Bank 
economists Shantayanan Devarajan, Margaret Miller, and Eric Swanson (2002) estimate the resources 
required both from the perspective of accelerating economic growth to achieve the overall poverty goal, 
and from amounts needed to achieve individual goals.  They find that countries would need an 
additional $40-$70 billion to support the policy and institutional changes necessary to achieve the goals.  
Both of these studies emphasize that ODA alone will not allow countries to achieve the goals, and that 
the estimates above are contingent on developing countries making important policy and institutional 
changes.  Taking the $55 billion midpoint of the second estimate, which is close to the first estimate, 
total ODA would have to double to about 0.46% of donor GNI, well below the target of 0.7%.  A third 
estimate is now under construction by the Millennium Task Force secretariat.  This estimate is not yet 
finalized, but preliminary results suggest that a figure somewhere between $55 billion and the $110 
billion consistent with 0.7% will be needed.  Thus, while 0.7% may not be necessary, significant 
increases over current amounts of ODA will be required for low-income countries to come close to 
achieving the MDGs. 
 
A More Goal and Results Oriented Approach 
 
In recent years, many low-income countries have produced Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs) as the 
blueprint for their development plans, priorities, and policies, and as the basis for donor support.  One of 
the first PRSs was Uganda’s Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), which was developed beginning 
in 1995.  The IMF and World Bank introduced Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in 1999, 
initially as a requirement for low-income countries to receive debt relief though the HIPC initiative and 
as a requirement for concessional funding from the IMF and the World Bank.  More than twenty-five 
countries have now completed full PRSPs, and dozens of others have drafted interim PRSPs.  The 
PRSPs are designed to increase the input to and ownership of development strategies by low-income 
countries and to provide a link between these strategies and donor support.   
 
PRSPs are far from a perfect instrument, and country experience has varied significantly.
5  Some are of 
reasonably high quality, while others are of poor quality.  Some PRSPs truly reflect the input of 
stakeholders in an attempt to make the difficult tradeoffs necessary to forge a development strategy, 
while others are written by consultants with a view towards writing what the donors want to hear rather 
than what the country really believes it needs.  Despite this uneven experience, the quality appears to be 
improving over time, and there is little doubt that the PRSP process is a step in the right direction of 




  MDGs in Poverty Reduction Strategies 
                                                 
5 For a joint IMF/World Bank progress report on the PRSP process, see 
http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/strategies/progrep.htm.  For additional commentary on the PRSP process see the ELDIS 
website at http://www.eldis.org/poverty/prsp.htm.   5
 
Among other things, PRSPs are supposed to state clear goals and focus on results.  World Bank and IMF 
staff are asked to assess whether the indicators contained in PRSPs define adequate goals for poverty 
reduction, establish appropriate indicators for progress, and set annual and medium term targets.  There 
are no specific links between the PRSPs and the MDGs, since the MDGs were adopted in 2000 after the 
PRSP process had already been adopted.  Harrison, Klugman, and Swanson (2003) found that for many 
PRSPs (although not all), the stated goals were reasonably consistent with the MDGs.  Their study 
examined targets in 27 PRSPs for malnutrition, primary enrollment, child mortality, maternal mortality, 
and access to water.  Where quantified targets were set, the PRSPs were at least as ambitious as the 
MDGs with respect to malnutrition, enrollment, and water.  However, the PRSPs generally were less 
ambitious than the MDGs for child and maternal mortality.  In addition, in over one-third of the cases 
there was not sufficient data for comparison, suggesting the PRSPs did not set specific enough targets in 
these areas, implying somewhat less ambition than the MDGs.  Thus the quality of PRSPs is 
inconsistent in this area: some have goals and targets consistent with or even more ambitious than the 
MDGs, while others do not.   
 
One possibility would be for the international community to require that countries base their PRSP 
targets fully on the MDGs. However, there is an obvious tension between this option and the idea of full 
country ownership of the PRSPs.  The MDGs were adopted by a senior level international conference 
through the UN, not at the local level in specific developing countries.  Some countries may set higher 
or lower goals in some areas, or may give higher priority to achieving (or going beyond) certain goals 
but not others.  On the one hand, strictly imposing the MDGs and their specific quantitative targets to 
some extent violates the idea of countries fully “owning” their own programs.  On the other hand, 
almost all low income countries adopted the Millennium Declaration in 2000, and the MDGs provide a 
useful consistent framework to measure global progress. 
 
Reconciling these two ideas, however, is not a major problem, and can be done by making the MDGs a 
specific point of reference for country targets, while not necessarily making them the targets themselves.  
All PRSPs should include specific references to the MDGs when establishing national goals, directly 
compare national goals to the MDGs, and briefly explain any significant differences.  To move in this 
direction, IMF and World Bank management should make this change in the guidance they give their 
staff for evaluating PRSPs.  Thus, for example, whatever target a country sets for primary school 
enrollment, the PRSP should compare this target with the MDG target of ensuring universal primary 
school enrollment by 2015, and explain any significant differences. 
 
  Realistic versus Ambitious Targets 
 
A second, and perhaps more important tension, is between “ambition” and “realism” in setting PRSP 
targets. Some observers are concerned that the targets set in the PRSPs are unrealistically high, raising 
expectations that cannot be fulfilled and setting government up to be considered failures.  Christiansen, 
Scott, and Wodon (2002), writing in the World Bank’s Sourcebook on Poverty Reduction Strategies, 
argue that “(m)ost often [PRSP targets] are overambitious; they are technically and fiscally unattainable, 
which defeats their role as effective incentives to action.”  Their concern is that unrealistically high 
targets only serve to set up a government for failure and loss of credibility.  According to this view, 
overly ambitious targets undermine incentives and can actually slow progress, since when they are seen 
as too difficult it is easier to give up on them than to make more effort, only to fail in the end.  
Moreover, overly ambitious targets with inadequate financial support could tempt governments to resort   6
to inflationary financing to meet the targets, which could upset macroeconomic balances and ultimately 
retard growth and poverty reduction.   
 
By contrast, others believe that the targets in the PRSPs are too low, and that the MDGs cannot be 
achieved without more ambitious, higher targets.  In this view, loftier targets – especially when coupled 
with clear plans of how to get there -- will lead to greater resource mobilization, stronger efforts, and 
ultimately better results.  When donors encourage poor countries to aim lower – as does the World 
Bank’s PRSP Sourcebook – it ensures weaker outcomes.  That is, setting mediocre targets only leads to 
mediocrity. Proponents of this view argue that governments should aim high, establish a plan for getting 
there, and then marshal the resources necessary to achieve their goals.   
 
There are three different reasons why some PRSP goals might be considered overly ambitious:   
 
•  Technically unattainable.  Some targets may simply not be possible, even with an ideal policy 
environment and far larger financial resources.  For example, cutting the infant mortality rate from 
150 per thousand to 50 per thousand in, say, one year, simply would not possible.  Similarly, 
reducing poverty at a rate consistent with sustained economic growth of, say, 15% per year is not 
feasible.  Goals that are truly technically infeasible obviously should be changed.  
 
•  Fiscally "unattainable."  Some targets are unattainable because of insufficient funding.  
Christiansen, et al (2002) conclude that “[PRSP] targets are often … fiscally unattainable.  For 
example, in many countries, the cost of reaching the targets set forward in the Poverty Reduction 
Strategies largely exceeds the amount of debt relief granted under the HIPC agreement.”  They go 
on to argue that these fiscally unattainable goals should be moderated to make them more attainable.  
In fact, these goals are not actually “unattainable” in the strict sense – they are only unattainable 
under current budget constraints.  With increased funding, they could be attainable. 
 
•  "Unattainable" because of other constraints.  Some goals may be unattainable because of policy or 
constraints.  For example, reducing the child mortality rate may be constrained because of 
prohibitions on drug imports that are protecting domestic producers.  Increasing cotton production 
may be limited by European and American cotton subsidies. Other goals may be unattainable 
because key institutions may not have the capacity to implement necessary changes, even with the 
appropriate policies and adequate funding.  Still others may be constrained by cultural norms.  For 
example, increasing the enrollment rate for girls may be constrained by traditions and practices that 
keep girls at home.  Some of these goals could be attained with policy changes or focused 
institutional strengthening; others may only be attainable over a longer period of time as institutions 
are strengthened and cultural norms evolve.   
 
To the extent that goals are "unattainable" because of financial, policy, or institutional constraints, 
poverty strategies should spell out the financial resources, policy reforms, or institutional changes 
needed to achieve the goals. When goals truly are unattainable, PRSs should explicitly say why.  Even 
for tougher issues, such as cultural norms, clearly stating the constraints and the steps needed to remove 
them over time would be a major step forward. 
 
To be sure, PRSs must contain “realistic” annual goals and targets that take account of existing budget 
realities, the political economy of policy reform, institutional constraints, and likely foreign assistance 
inflows. Throwing realism out the window would not be responsible, and would make short term   7
economic planning very difficult.  At the same time, it is equally important to provide a parallel 
framework that lays out the changes needed for a country to achieve far more ambitious goals, even if 
they do not seem realistic in the short run. Towards this end, PRSs (whether PRSPs or otherwise) should 
provide at least two (and perhaps more) scenarios.   
 
•  A baseline scenario that would lay out development goals, a macroeconomic framework and 
sectoral priorities consistent with current levels of domestic and international financing, “realistic” 
policy changes; and current institutional constraints.  It should describe the expected progress under 
this scenario towards achieving key longer-term goals and the MDGs consistent. It should also 
clarify key tradeoffs that might have to be made in a constrained environment between further 
progress in one goal versus another. 
 
•  A high achievement scenario with more ambitious targets, consistent with achieving the MDGs or 
similar national goals, detailing the level of financing and additional policy and institutional changes 
needed to achieve these goals.  Generally, these scenarios would require more than simply changing 
the spending line and the goal.  Higher funding may require other accompanying changes in order to 
meet the goal.  For example, providing more AIDS patients with anti-retroviral drugs would require 
increased funding, but also additional training of health workers and a procurement and delivery 
system.  In most countries, the high achievement scenario would be relatively close to the baseline 
scenario in the early years, since it may be difficult to relieve financial, policy, and institutional 
constraints in the short run.  Moreover, in general there is likely to be more than one combination of 
policies and financing that could lead to broadly similar progress towards these more ambitious 
goals, and where relevant these alternative scenarios should be spelled out.  The high achievement 
scenario would need to face head-on the challenge of strengthening key institutions, such as the 
budget authority, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, and regional and local 
governments, and spell out the key changes over time needed to make these institutions more 
effective. 
 
At a minimum, laying out an ambitious scenario would clearly identify to all parties the major 
constraints inhibiting an accelerated pace of development, which could act as a first step towards 
relieving those constraints and making more progress possible.  A more ambitious vision could 
encourage greater domestic debate about policy and institutional weaknesses that slow development 
progress, and encourage greater discussions with the international community about what might be 
possible.  Domestic actors could begin to see the expected benefits that might follow from additional 
policy changes, and the international community could see the level of development progress expected 
for different levels of funding.  There are obvious risks to both domestic political leadership and to 
international organizations in publicizing a more ambitious scenario, but also potential rewards in being 
able to more quickly achieve critical development goals. 
 
For the donor community, this approach would require some changes. Consultative group meetings 
should determine not only the amount of funding that donors are willing to commit, but the likely 
implications of that funding (and alternative levels of funding) for progress towards the goals under a 
given set of policies.  Moreover, this approach implies re-aligning donor priorities with those spelled out 
in the PRS.  Too often donors push their own priorities to satisfy interest groups in their own country 
rather than responding to the recipient country’s highest priorities.  To achieve the ambitious targets set 
out in PRSs, donors must be willing to fund well-designed activities, projects, and programs consistent 
with those goals, and not push funding in lower-priority areas.   8
 
Improved Data and Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
Implementing these changes also means vastly improving data collection and monitoring and evaluation 
of development activities.  The quality of the data needed to monitor the MDGs is nothing short of 
pathetic in some countries.  Key data are missing, and where they are available they are often inaccurate.  
Most shocking is the poor quality of data in government budgets, which is the most central of policy 
documents.  Another is on tariffs: there is no international data base with comparable data on even 
average tariff rates, much less tariff dispersion or commodity specific tariffs. The quality of data on 
health and education indicators is weaker still.   
 
The poor quality of data is important: policymakers cannot adequately figure out how to get where they 
want to go if they do not know where they are.  Leaders cannot figure out which interventions have 
worked and which have not, and thus cannot appropriately decide how to allocate new financial and 
personnel resources going forward.  The good news is that with concerted efforts, data quality can 
improve.  For example, the quality of macroeconomic data, especially monetary and debt data, and to 
some extent trade data, has improved markedly over the past two decades, mostly because the IMF 
demanded it and countries had to produce it.  With partnerships between recipient and donor countries, 
including sufficient financing, the quality of other data can improve as well.  This should be a major 
focus for multilateral development banks going forward. 
 
More serious targets combined with better statistics provide the foundation for improved monitoring and 
evaluation and results-based management of aid programs.  Some donors are beginning to seriously 
implement a results-based approach, led by the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations 
(GAVI) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM).  Stronger monitoring 
and evaluation begins with setting clear, monitorable targets and establishing solid baseline data, as 
described earlier.  It requires involving monitoring staff from the beginning of a project, not bringing 
them in half way through.   
 
Monitoring is required for financial accountability, progress on building institutional capacity, and 
progress on achieving substantive goals.  A key objective is to maintain a focus on results by providing 
continued funding to activities that show results, and reducing funding to those that do not.  Donors 
have to be much more willing to cut off funding for activities that are not working and to allocate those 
funds to more promising areas.  But the main intent is not punitive.  Rather, the idea is to keep programs 
on track by detecting problems at an early stage and enabling policymakers to make adjustments and 
corrections as soon as possible.  Strong monitoring and evaluation also allows the lessons learned from 
one activity to be incorporated into other activities.  Improving monitoring and evaluation systems faces 
many obstacles, including poor data, the difficulty of measuring certain activities (such as the quality of 
technical assistance), establishing the appropriate counterfactual, and establishing the appropriate 
incentives for independent monitors.  Some progress has been made in recent years in this direction.  
For example, the “Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21
st Century” (PARIS 21) is designed 
to promote evidence-based policymaking and monitoring in developing countries.  The group promotes 
the importance of basic statistics and the connection of data to sound policies.
6  In addition to GAVI and 
GFATM, the World Bank and some other donors have begun to move towards more evidence-based 
programs.  More serious efforts by most donors in these areas will be necessary to improve the 
effectiveness of foreign aid in helping to achieve the MDGs. 
                                                 
6 For more information on PARIS 21, see www.paris21.org/index.htm.   9
 
Improving the Allocation of ODA 
 
The international community has reached a broad consensus that ODA is most effective in reducing 
poverty and supporting economic growth when it is aimed at countries with the deepest poverty and 
with policies and institutions that support economic development. Experience suggests that aid given for 
political purposes to countries with poor governance -- such as for Cold War allies – has had little 
development effect, whereas aid provided to countries with better governance and a commitment to 
strong development policies -- such as Korea, Botswana, or Thailand – has had a stronger impact.   
 
Empirical research supporting the idea of "country selectivity," in which aid is allocated to countries 
with greater needs and better governance, began in earnest in the mid-1990s, focussing first on rates of 
return to investment projects and later on the relationship between aid and growth.  For example, Isham, 
Kaufmann, and Pritchett (1995) found a strong link between a country’s civil liberties and the rates of 
return on aid-financed investments.  Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Collier and Dollar (2002) took the 
next step, finding that foreign aid is positively associated with growth in countries with better policies 
and institutions, and not associated with growth in countries with poor policies and institutions.
7  The 
Burnside, Dollar, and Collier studies have come under attack from two directions in recent years.  From 
one direction, several studies challenge the finding that the positive aid/growth relationship depends on 
good policies, finding instead that aid is positively correlated with growth (with diminishing returns) 
regardless of the policy environment.
8  From another direction, Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2003) 
found that the initial Burnside and Dollar results were not robust to new data points, different time 
frames, varying definitions of aid, and alternative definitions of policy.  They found no clear relationship 
between aid and growth. 
 
While the empirical debate continues, the idea that aid works better in countries with stronger policies 
and governance has influenced the policies of the World Bank, the regional development banks, and 
several bilateral donor agencies.  This idea makes intuitive sense to many development practitioners, 
and has become the consensus view in the development community.  Based partly on these ideas, the 
World Bank has developed a Performance Based Allocation (PBA) system as the basis for distributing 
its IDA funding, which in large part relies on the Bank's ratings of each country's policies, institutions, 
and governance (IDA, 2003).  The African and Asian Development Banks use similar systems. Perhaps 
the clearest manifestation of the country selectivity approach is the United States' new Millennium 
Challenge Account, in which ODA will be provided to a very small group of low-income countries with 
a record of strong governance, social investments, and economic policy (Radelet, 2003). 
 
  The Governance-Income Relationship 
 
In considering the country selectivity approach, it is important to recognize that the empirical evidence 
(such as it is) does not simply say that aid works best in countries with better policies and governance, 
period.  A more appropriate interpretation is that aid works best in countries with stronger governance 
after controlling for the level of income.  That is, for two countries at the same level of income, aid is 
likely to have a larger impact on growth in the country with better policies and governance.  The 
difference is important.  Since richer countries tend to have stronger governance ratings than poorer 
                                                 
7 Burnside and Dollar concentrated on policies (trade policy, budget deficits and inflation), whereas Dollar and Collier 
included broader policy and institutional, and governance measures.  
8 For example, Delgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2002); Hansen and Tarp (2000); and Lensink and White (1999a, 1999b).   10
countries, looking only at raw governance scores suggests to some people that aid only works in the 
countries that are richer and better governed – precisely the countries that don’t need aid.  If donor 
agencies simply allocated aid to countries with better governance, they would systematically eliminate 
some of the poorest countries of the world that have low absolute governance scores, but may have 
reasonably strong governance for their level of income. This implies that when looking at a country’s 
raw governance score, a modification is required to adjust for the level of income.  The Appendix shows 
a simple way to make this adjustment, and shows an income-adjusted governance ranking of low-
income countries.    
 
  Aid Allocation: Are Donors Becoming More Selective? 
 
The debates about country selectivity in recent years have led to donor pledges to improve aid 
allocation.  However, ODA continues to flow in large amounts to middle income countries with less 
poverty and to countries with poor governance.  As a result, much of current ODA is wasted -- aid 
quickly becomes ineffective in countries with poor policies and weak governance, while countries with 
better governance get less aid than they can effectively use.   
 
Figure 1 shows the simple average of ODA receipts per capita (in constant 2002 dollars) across six 
country groups in 1996 and 2002: low income countries with poor, mediocre, and strong governance, 
and higher income countries divided into the same three governance groups.  The low income group 
includes all countries (with populations over 1 million) with per capita incomes below the 1996 IDA 
historical cutoff of $1,505, and the high income group is made up of all countries (with populations over 
1 million) with income above that level that received ODA.  The poor, mediocre and strong governance 
groups are the countries in bottom, middle and top third of modified governance scores (after controlling 
for income, as described in the Appendix).  The 2002 groupings are created in a similar way, using the 
2002 IDA historical cutoff of $1,415. 
 
The figure shows that in 1996, low-income countries with strong governance received only slightly 
more ODA per capita than those with weaker governance.  The higher income group received less aid 
per capita, but not substantially less.  Note that if the figures were calculated as ODA per person below 
the poverty line, the difference between the lower and higher income groups would be even smaller, 
since a lower percentage of people in the richer developing countries live below the poverty line. 
 
By 2002, the story had not changed appreciably.  Among the low income countries, the countries with 
stronger governance received only slightly more than countries with weaker governance.  The difference 
between the lower and higher income groups was even smaller, suggesting even less allocation by need 
than in 1996.  Furthermore, within the higher income group, there was essentially no difference in ODA 
receipts between the three governance sub-groups.  The implication is that by this simple measure, there 
has been little, if any, improvement in the allocation of ODA towards poorer countries with better 
governance. 
 
Allocation Rules to Constrain the Political Allocation of Aid 
 
In an extension of the basic empirical framework developed by Burnside and Dollar, Collier and Dollar 
(2001, 2002) show how a reallocation of ODA to countries with the most severe poverty and better 
policies and institutions could approximately double aid effectiveness.  They derive a “poverty-
efficient” allocation of aid aimed at maximizing the extent of poverty reduction that could be realized 
with a given amount of aid by first deriving a relationship between policy/governance scores and   11
economic growth, and then the relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction.  They find 
that an optimal allocation of aid flows would almost double the number of people lifted out of poverty, 
an outcome that they estimate would require a tripling of aid budgets under current allocations. 
 
The Collier-Dollar model provides a mathematical formula for allocating aid amongst countries to make 
aid as "poverty efficient" efficient as possible.  The World Bank's PBA system provides similar formal 
rules for aid allocation, although the two differ in some ways (and thus arrive at somewhat different 
allocation rules).  One could imagine a range of formal models that would achieve similar ends, each 
with slightly different allocation rules, depending on which policies and governance measures were 
included, which were given the most weight, and the precise income categories and poverty measures 
chosen.  Long hours have been spent in donor meetings arguing the finer points of these PBA systems, 
with different analysts arguing for slightly different formulations.  For example, countless meetings took 
place in Washington, DC, during 2001 and 2002 to debate the qualification standards for the new 
Millennium Challenge Account.   
 
These debates are important, as surely it is important to get these systems right and not omit worthy 
countries.  But at the same time, there is a danger that these debates risk missing the forest for the trees.  
The empirical basis for these models, and for the efficacy of any particular policy or institutional 
measure, is not strong enough for any one approach to be declared the absolute superior approach.  At 
the same time, almost any one of them is far superior to the current allocation of aid.  As Collier (2002) 
has pointed out, the idea is not to set aid allocations by a rigid, mechanistic formula that must be 
precisely adhered to like a straightjacket.  Rather, the idea is to establish a system that provides some 
analytic guidance for donor agencies interested in allocating their aid more effectively, and to provide 
them with some defenses against the overt manipulation of aid for political or commercial purposes.  
There is no doubt that some ODA will continue to be allocated for these non-development purposes, 
many of which are legitimate national security goals of donor countries.  But if donor agencies start with 
a transparent, objective formula aimed at maximizing the poverty effectiveness of aid, it will be harder 
for other parts of the bureaucracy to change aid allocations, since the costs of a re-allocation will 
become more transparent. 
 
Aid, Economic Shocks, and Post Conflict Situations  
 
Going beyond the basic rules of aid allocation, aid can be highly effective in cushioning against 
economic shocks within the group of well-governed countries.  Collier and Dehn (2001) found that 
when aid increased during a negative export shock, the aid in effect arrested the economic downturn 
emanating from the shock.  Each extra $1 in aid reduced the contraction in output by $2, making the 
return on aid especially high during these periods.  Unfortunately, donors are not very good at taking 
advantage of this situation, as Collier and Dehn find no evidence to suggest that aid flows systematically 
increase following severe shocks.  Only two donor mechanisms have bee established specifically to 
provide flows following shocks -- The EU's STABEX program and the IMF's Contingent Compensatory 
Finance Facility -- and both failed to be effective.
9  Standard bilateral and multilateral aid flows are too 
slow and cumbersome to react quickly enough to export shocks to take advantage of these high returns, 
especially since most ODA comes as project aid.  More flexible donor mechanisms, as discussed later in 
the paper, could help aid cushion against these adverse shocks and thereby increase overall aid 
effectiveness. 
                                                 
9 STABEX was so slow that disbursements usually occurred after the recipient economy was well into recovery.  The 
program is now closed.  The CCFF – now the CFF (after dropping “Contingent”) is very rarely used.   12
 
Aid also has the potential to be highly effective in post-conflict situations.  Collier and Hoeffler (2002) 
find that, under a poverty-efficient allocation of aid, about twice as much aid should be allocated to 
post-conflict countries as to similar non-conflict countries, since post-conflict countries are starting from 
a lower economic base, have the potential for rapid catch-up growth, and have a higher absorptive 
capacity for aid.  Mozambique, for example, has received large amounts of aid in the decade since its 
civil war has ended, which (along with policy reforms and institutional changes) has led to very a high 
rate of economic growth.  The World Bank (2003) also argues for significant aid to post-conflict 
countries, not just because the economic rates of return are potentially higher, but as a way of reducing 
the risk of a country slipping back into conflict. 
 
 
Improving Aid Delivery 
 
Improving the allocation of aid is only one step toward making aid more effective.  Donors must also 
significantly improve the way that they deliver aid. 
 
Aid Delivery Strategies in Different Countries 
 
Donors have a variety of different objectives for foreign aid in different kinds of countries.  In many 
countries, the primary goal is economic development, including accelerating economic growth, reducing 
poverty, and improving the delivery of social services.  In many cases, there is a twin goal of supporting 
political development, most often in the form of consolidating democracy.  In other countries, however, 
longer-term economic and political development take a back set to the more immediate goal of 
preventing conflict or preventing a re-emergence of conflict.  In still others, a major goal is to provide 
humanitarian assistance following either a natural disaster or in the context of political instability.  In 
addition, many bilateral donors provide aid to support their own foreign policies goals.  For example, 
significant portions of U.S. foreign aid currently go to support allies in the war on terrorism, and 
historically much aid has gone to try to support the Middle East peace process.  Similarly, the French 
government has supplied significant amounts of aid in order to maintain influence in its former colonies 
in Africa. All of these are legitimate goals for foreign aid.  In many cases, of course, donors are trying to 
achieve more than one of these goals at once. 
 
At the same time, circumstances on the ground vary widely in recipient countries.  Some have much 
greater need than others, in terms of the extent of poverty and in terms of economic vulnerability.  Some 
have relatively good governance, while in other governance is quite poor; similarly, some suffer intense 
and ongoing political instability, whereas others are much more stable.  Some governments have a 
strong commitment to good development policies, whereas others give only lip service to poverty 
reduction and development.  Institutional capacity also varies widely, with different governments being 
more or less able to implement their development strategies.  The quality and abilities of agencies 
outside the government – NGOs, the private sector, charitable organizations -- to help implement 
development programs also varies widely. 
 
Yet despite these differences in donor objectives and circumstances on the ground, donors tend to 
deliver aid similarly in most recipient countries.  Yet this makes little sense.  Aid should be delivered to 
countries with better governance very differently than to countries with poor governance. To date, the 
move towards greater "country selectivity" has been conceived primarily as allocating more ODA to 
countries with better policies and stronger institutions. However, the idea that aid is likely to be more   13
effective in well-governed countries should influence more than just the amount of aid that donors 
provide -- it should change the way that donors administer aid, in several important ways:   
 
•  First, in well-governed countries, recipients should have a much greater say in setting priorities and 
in designing aid-financed programs than in poorly governed countries.  In recent years there has 
been much discussion of, and in some cases actual movement towards, providing recipients with 
much greater "ownership" of aid financed programs. This approach began with the PRSP approach, 
and has been taken very seriously by some new donor organizations such as the Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI) and the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria 
(GFATM).  The extent to which "country ownership" has actually taken hold is a subject of debate.  
There is a clear tension between, on the one hand, the need for recipients to be involved in and 
committed to programs to ensure their success, and on the other hand, the need for donors ensure 
programmatic responsibility.  
Providing recipients with more flexibility, greater latitude, and more ownership is precisely the 
right way for donors to move in well-governed countries, but not necessarily in poorly governed 
ones.  Donors should move to a much more differentiated strategy with respect to country 
ownership.  Countries with stronger governance should be given the responsibility for setting the 
broad priorities and designing programs financed by ODA.  This should start with the design of 
poverty reduction strategies, and should be carried through to specific donor activities that grow out 
of the PRS process.  Donors should be prepared to finance activities designed by recipients and 
reflecting recipient priorities, subject to strong technical review.  By contrast, in weak, failing, and 
poorly governed countries where governments have shown little commitment to good development 
policy, donors should retain a strong role in setting priorities and designing programs.  In many 
poorly governed countries, donors still talk about increased country ownership, even when they have 
no intention of actually allowing it.  The mismatch between words and deeds is unhelpful for donor 
and recipients alike.  In other words, the rhetoric of "country ownership" should be matched with 
more reality in well-governed countries, while it should be significantly diminished or even dropped 
in poorly governed ones. 
 
•  Second, donors should provide a greater share their financing as programmatic or budget support 
in well-governed countries, while primarily (or even exclusively) using project financing in poorly 
governed countries.  ODA in the form of budget support or as programs (including Sector Wide 
Approaches, or SWAps) gives the recipient greater flexibility to use funds for their highest priority, 
adapt to changing needs, and to finance recurrent as well as capital costs as necessary.  Budget 
support allows ODA to be more consistent with the government’s development strategy (since the 
budget should provide the blueprint for allocating public sector resources) and more easily integrates 
ODA with government financial resources aimed at development activities. ODA in this form tends 
to strengthen government financial institutions, whereas project support can weaken them by pulling 
resources away from budget systems to individual satellite projects.  Well-governed countries should 
be given the discretion and flexibility that comes with receiving programmatic financing and budget 
support, so long as they have adequate financial systems in place (including regularly published 
budgets, appropriate accounting and auditing standards, and regular public monitoring) and are able 
to continue to show results.   
In poorly governed countries, programmatic funding and budget support makes much less sense.  
Donors should not provide broad program support in countries with high levels of corruption, 
opaque budget procedures, and poor monitoring and auditing.  To provide budget support under 
these circumstances, where there is little confidence that funds will be used appropriately would be   14
irresponsible.  The most likely outcomes will be no discernable progress on development goals (and 
possibly some retrogression) and a loss of support for aid by taxpayers in donor countries.  In poorly 
governed countries, donors should continue to direct their funds at well-defined projects that can be 
carefully monitored and that provide recipient governments with much less discretion. 
 
•  Third, consistent with programmatic and budget support, donors should support a broader range of 
activities in well-governed countries, while in poorly-governed countries they should look for 
narrower targets of opportunity.  In effect, donors can finance the PRS as a whole in well-governed 
countries, including a wide array of activities in different sectors. Of course, this does not mean that 
anything and everything should be funded, as there is still a need to set priorities and allocate 
resources to the highest priorities.  Nor does it mean that every donor should fund all aspects of a 
development strategy – individual donors should focus on the areas they do best in order to avoid 
duplication and overlap.  But it does mean that the donors as a group, working closely with the 
recipient government, should be thinking in terms of supporting a full-fledged development strategy, 
rather than individual projects.  By contrast, in poorly governed countries, donors should have a 
narrower focus.  In the weakest states, international support should focus on basic consumption or 
social services for the poor, while in slightly stronger countries support could broaden to particular 
sectors where the government has shown some commitment and potential for progress. 
 
•  Fourth, most (but not all) donor assistance should be channeled through the government in well-
governed countries, while a larger share should go through NGOs in poorly governed countries.  
Aid to the central government can be more easily aligned with the government's development 
strategy, and can be better integrated into the budget.  However, not all ODA should go though the 
central government, since it is likely to have limited capacity to implement all worthwhile projects.  
Providing all aid funds to the central government could create a larger than necessary public sector, 
and forgo the possibility of providing aid effectively through other agencies.  In some circumstances, 
provincial and local governments can provide services effectively through donor-financed programs.  
In principle, local and provincial governments are better placed to articulate local priorities and to 
take advantage of local strengths to implement programs focused on the MDGs.  However, many 
local and provincial governments are weak, even in well-governed countries.  Thus, these 
approaches should include provisions for capacity building, and probably should be limited in scale 
in many countries. 
 
In order to achieve the MDGs as quickly as possible, some ODA should be channeled through 
NGOs, which can often help deliver services cheaply and effectively.  There are many examples of 
effective ODA-financed NGO activities that are helping to achieve the MDGs (such as Love Life in 
South Africa, The AIDS Support Organization in Uganda, the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, and 
many others).  Utilizing NGOs can help alleviate absorptive capacity issues by expanding the 
number of agencies that provide services.  In poorly governed countries, a much larger share of 
ODA should go through the NGOs, since the government’s capacity is weaker and, in many cases, 
cannot be trusted to be an effective development partner.  In countries with the weakest governance, 
no aid should go through the government at all. 
 
However, NGOs are not a panacea, and donors should consider several issues in working with 
NGOs.  First, NGO activities should be consistent with the government's PRS and the budget, 
assuming that the PRS was developed with broad participation including NGOs.  Second, not all 
NGOs make effective development partners, and not all represent the broader constituencies that   15
they claim to represent.  Third, providing funds to NGOs could potentially undermine government 
capacity by drawing scarce talent away from the government to work in NGOs.  (However, as long 
as the bulk of funds are provided to the government in well-governed countries, this problem will be 
minimized).  Fourth, providing some funds to NGOs can provide some healthy competition for the 
government.  Fifth, working with NGOs can exacerbate the sometimes acrimonious relationship 
between the government and NGOs, which at times is fueled by donor funds. There is a tension 
between, on the one hand, NGOs expanding available services, providing competition for 
government and pushing them to provide important services more effectively, and on the other hand, 
the risk that some NGOs undermine governments and work in areas that are not national priorities. 
 
The key point is that to achieve the MDGs, donors should work with effective partners at all 
levels of government and with those outside the government, and that the appropriate mix of 
effective partners is likely to be very different across recipient countries. 
 
•  Fifth, donors should provide longer-term financial commitments in well-governed countries than in 
poorly governed countries.  All donor support -- in well-governed or poorly governed countries, 
whether program or project support -- should be provided on a timeline consistent with recipient 
budget cycles.  Too many donor funds are provided outside of normal budget cycles, making 
planning unnecessarily difficult for recipients.  In addition, donors need to make longer-term 
commitments, at least for well-governed countries.  ODA funds are typically committed at most 
three years in advance, too short for planning purposes for many long-term investment projects.  
Achieving the MDGs will be a long-term process for many low-income countries, requiring a long-
term commitment to sound policies and institutional change, along with long-term financing.  Many 
of the policy and institutional changes needed to achieve the MDGs will take many years, and 
recipients need the assurance of a long-term commitment in order to undertake these changes with 
greater confidence.   
 
Of course, long-term donor commitments should be contingent on recipients continuing to 
achieve their short and medium run targets and otherwise continuing with good governance.  But 
donors must better recognize the time required to achieve long-term development goals, including 
the MDGs.  Consider the following: a country with income of $300 per capita that records economic 
growth per capita of 5% per year (a rapid rate equivalent to overall GDP growth of about 7% per 
year) will take 32 years to reach per capita income of $1,415, the current cut-off for IDA eligibility.  
Donors must give recipients – especially those committed to strong development policies -- more 
assurance that they are in for the long haul.  This does not mean that donor funding should be 
expected to remain at very high levels for extended periods of time.  The amount of donor funding 
should be expected to gradually decline over time as incomes grow and the country achieves its 
medium term development goals.  For the most successful developing countries during the last 30 
years, aid flows have declined gradually over time.  For example, for the 22 countries that have 
permanently graduated from IDA – a group of fairly successful developing countries -- the half life 
of aid was about 12 years, meaning that the real dollar value of aid declined by 50% over 12 years 
and by 75% over 24 years (Clemens and Radelet, 2003).  Long-term donor commitments should aim 
to follow a similar pattern. 
 
In making these five points, I have made a clears distinction better well-governed and poorly governed 
countries.  Of course, some countries fall between these sharp divisions of poor and well governed, and 
others are in transition between these two poles.  For countries in this middle group, mixed strategies are   16
called for in terms of the degree of donor involvement in setting priorities and programs, the form of 
funding (program versus project), the range of activities funded, the implementation partners on the 
ground, and the length of financing commitment. 
 
Three Basic Strategies for Three Country Groups  
 
These considerations suggest that donors should have three well-defined and distinctive strategies 
that they use to deliver aid in different kinds of low-income countries, depending primarily on the 
quality of their governance.  Somewhat different approaches will be necessary for middle-income 
countries, as discussed below. 
 
Low-Income, Well-Governed Countries 
 
Donors should be most generous and most flexible in these countries.  These countries have 
substantial needs along with a track record of strong governance (relative to countries of similar income 
levels).  Donors should provide the largest amounts of financing to this group of countries, and it should 
be delivered predominately as budget support or program aid. The recipients should be given much of 
the responsibility to set priorities and design aid-financed activities consistent with their own 
development strategies, which presumably will reflect the MDGs.  The central government should be 
the largest recipient of ODA and should take the lead in coordinating the donors, but (depending on the 
country) local and provincial governments and NGOs should also receive significant funding. 
Delivering aid through programs rather than projects will also allow donors to respond more quickly 
when these countries are hit by negative economic shocks. Programs should be monitored and evaluated 
carefully, with donors encouraging some experimentation with new ideas and approaches.  Programs 
that show results should be funded generously, while those that do not should receive less funding or be 
shut down.  Donors should focus less on micromanaging activities and more on measuring and 
achieving results.  Donors should be willing to clearly commit specific funding for five-to-ten years in 
these countries, subject to the strict requirements that recipient show continued good governance and 
achieve reasonable results.  Continued good performance should merit longer term funding, with the 
amount of funding gradually declining in the long term as these economies grow and gain access to 
private capital markets.   
 
Low-Income Countries with Average Governance 
 
These countries also require significant funding, but they should receive less than in the well-
governed countries, and it should be delivered differently.  Although recipients should play an active 
role in setting priorities and designing projects, donors should be actively involved in ensuring broad-
based participation and technical rigor.  Budget and program support should be limited, if used at all, 
and should be monitored very carefully.  Most funding should come in the form of well-designed 
projects consistent with the country's overall development strategy, focusing on key activities where 
achieving results seems most likely.  Donors should focus primarily in areas where the government has 
shown the strongest commitment and there is potential for progress.  The length of financial 
commitments should be shorter than for well-governed countries, perhaps around three to five years, 
contingent on progress and results.  A larger share of funding should go through NGOs.  Project 
performance should be monitored carefully in these countries, with clearly delineated performance 
standards.  Strong performance should be met with increased financial support with longer 
commitments, while weak results should lead to less aid.  Donors must be prepared to reduce funding 
when countries do not meet agreed performance standards.   17
 
Low-Income, Poorly Governed Countries 
 
This group of countries roughly corresponds to the countries the World Bank refers to Low Income 
Countries Under Stress (LICUS) and the OECD calls "Difficult Partnerships."  Some of these countries 
are failed states, others are failing, while still other could be considered weak or fragile.  These countries 
must be dealt with on a careful, case-by-case basis, as the circumstances on the ground can vary widely.  
Some countries are in a downward cycle, where the political and economic situation appears destined to 
get worse before it gets better.  Others are struggling to end conflict; still others are emerging from 
conflict and are beginning to show progress.  Some countries are not faced with conflict, but are mired 
with poor governance, high levels of corruption, and governments with little interest in political or 
economic development.  In these countries, bilateral aid will be heavily influenced by strategic and 
security considerations.  For example, the United States has expressed strong concern about "failed 
states" as part of the war on terrorism and has allocated substantial sums to weak states that are its allies 
in the war. 
 
Foreign aid to poorly governed countries should be tightly focused on humanitarian relief and providing 
basic services to the poor.  Donors should focus on a very limited set of very high priority activities with 
the potential for quick results that can be demonstrated to policymakers and the general public to help 
consolidate the process of further reform (World Bank, 2001).  Donors should play a much stronger role 
in setting priorities and designing activities here than in countries with strong governance, where 
country ownership can be put into practice.  Program aid and budget support, by and large, is out of the 
question, and in some countries, no aid should be provided at all. Since governments are very weak, 
significant amounts of aid should be directed at civil society groups and NGOs.  The World Bank (2001) 
and Collier (2002) have suggested establishing Independent Service Providers (which Collier likens to 
an expenditure-side version of an Independent Revenue Board) to oversee the delivery of basic services.  
Working in these countries is much riskier than other places.  As a result, programs in poorly governed 
states require very careful monitoring, regular re-appraisal, flexible responses as initiatives begin to 
work or fail, and a higher tolerance for failure than when working in other countries. 
 
Within this set of countries, aid has the most potential to be effective in post-conflict situations, as 
discussed previously.  As discussed previously, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) find that, under a poverty-
efficient allocation of aid, about twice as much aid should be allocated to post-conflict countries as to 
similar non-conflict countries.  However, the World Bank (2003) warns against the typical donor pattern 
of providing significant aid in the first year or two after the conflict ends when the country is very 
visible on the international agenda, followed by a sharp decline in aid.  It argues instead for a slower 
ramping up of aid as peace is solidified, augmented by other international measures of support, 
especially peacekeeping forces.  Aid flows should build to a peak four to five years after the conflict and 
gradually diminishing thereafter. 
 
One of the most difficult questions for donors working in poorly governed countries is when to continue 
providing some aid and when to stop.  Since aid tends to be least effective in poorly governed countries, 
continuing with disbursements may have a high opportunity costs since the same aid could be used more 
productively elsewhere.  Moreover, aid flows, if not directed carefully, can help sustain bad 
governments or further weaken the quality of governance (Knack, 2001).  However, there may be 
significant costs from entirely disengaging, including a greater risk of further destabilization and 
violence, or a deterioration of health and education systems (OECD 2001).  It is probably true, as the   18
OECD argues, that it is important for the international community -- not all donors, but perhaps some -- 




Most foreign aid should be directed at low-income countries, since they have the greatest needs and the 
least access to alternative sources of financing.  Middle income countries tend to have a larger domestic 
tax base and greater access to international capital markets, both of which should help these countries 
finance social expenditures, infrastructure and poverty reduction programs.  However, many middle 
income countries still have large numbers of poor people, a fact which sometimes is obscured by very 
unequal distribution of income.  For example, Birdsall (2002) estimates that in Brazil in the 1990s, the 
median household income was only about one-third as high as the mean level of income, with the 
former hovering very near the higher of the two international poverty lines of $2/day. (Of course, the 
$2/day poverty line is nearly double the average income of all of sub-Saharan Africa). In Honduras, the 
median household income was less than half of the mean, with the median well below the $2/day 
poverty line. 
 
The primary responsible for fighting poverty in middle income countries lies with their own 
governments, which must forge policies that support broad based economic growth, job creation, and 
investments in health and education.  Official finance from donor agencies can play a supporting role.  
Clearly, any official financing provided to middle income countries should be much less concessional 
than funds for low-income countries, so as to reserve the bulk of donor resources for low-income 
countries.  For most purposes, non-concessional financing, such as from IBRD, is appropriate.  
However, middle income governments are reluctant to borrow on market terms to finance social 
expenditures.  For example, it makes little sense for countries like South Africa, Botswana, and Brazil to 
borrow from international capital markets to finance HIV/AIDS programs.  Some international financial 
agencies are providing HIV/AIDS funding on grant terms for middle income countries as well as low 
income countries, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.   
 
Whereas donors probably allocate too much ODA to middle income countries (from a Collier-Dollar 
type poverty-efficiency point of view), donors should still provide some funding to these countries. 
Bilateral donors should consider providing limited financing to middle income countries for programs 
clearly aimed at providing services and financing investments directed at the poor, where governments 
are unable to obtain financing from other sources.  Multilateral donors that provide non-concessional 
finance should look for creative ways to ensure that governments are investing in the poor and breaking 
down barriers that exclude the poor from economic opportunities, even if their funds are not directly 
aimed at them.  For example, IBRD-financed loans for infrastructure projects could be made contingent 
on the government implementing policies aimed at poor.  It might be possible to consider using some 
donor funds, in effect, to slightly soften the terms of IBRD loans under these conditions.  The basic 
point is for donors to ensure that any funds provided to middle income countries are used as leverage to 
ensure policies changes that favor the poor.
10 
 
Obviously, the quality of governance matters as much in middle income countries as it does in low-
income countries.  As with poorer countries, the quality of governance should determine both the 
amount of money and the way in which it is delivered to different middle income countries.  Donors 
                                                 
10 I thank Masood Ahmed for these suggestions.   19
should provide more money and provide it more flexibly to well-governed middle income countries, 




This paper has suggested several concrete ways in which donors could make aid more effective to 
achieve the MDGs.  Donors should work with low-income countries to ensure that poverty reduction 
strategies have specific, well-defined goals both in the short-run and long-run.  The international 
community should expect that PRSs specifically refer to the MDGs, even if governments choose to 
adopt goals that do not exactly coincide with the MDGs.  PRSs should provide a "baseline scenario" 
with short, medium, and long run targets consistent with the most likely policy change and levels of 
financing.  In addition, they should provide a "high achievement" scenario with much more ambitious 
targets and a more rapid pace of development, laying out the additional policy, institutional, and 
financing changes needed to reach these goals.  
 
Donors must go beyond the rhetoric of "country selectivity" and actually begin to allocate aid more 
seriously to poorer countries with strong and moderate governance.  They should establish basic rules 
for allocating aid based on poverty and the quality of governance, not to be dogmatic and rigid, but to 
provide some defenses against other forces that push to allocate aid based on political and commercial 
considerations.  Donors should also introduce more flexible mechanisms that can provide aid to cushion 
against negative economic shocks. 
 
Country selectivity, however, must go well beyond simply allocating more money to countries with 
stronger governance.  Well-governed countries should have a much greater say in designing aid 
programs, should receive more of their aid as program funding, and should receive longer-term 
commitments from the donor community.  Poorly governed countries should not only receive less 
money, they should receive more of it as project aid, it should come with a shorter time commitment, 
and much of it should be distributed through NGOs.  
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Appendix: Adjusting Governance Scores for Levels of Income 
 
There are many possible governance or policy indicators that could be used to measure country 
performance.  The original Burnside and Dollar analysis used a policy variable combining inflation, the 
budget deficit, and trade policy; a later version added an institutional quality score.  The World Bank’s 
Performance-Based Allocation system uses the Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA), which combines 20 different policies and institutional ratings.  For simplicity, here I will use 
the country governance ratings produced by Dani Kaufmann and Aart Kraay of the World Bank 
Institute.
11  To create this database, the authors compile 275 governance indicators from 20 sources and 
18 organizations.  They construct six composite indices of various components of governance: control 
of corruption, rule of law, political stability, voice and accountability, quality and effectiveness of 
government institutions, and regulatory quality.  The scores are scaled so that the world median is zero, 
a ranking one standard deviation above the median is given a score of 1, etc.  The six indices can then be 
averaged to provide one aggregate governance score.  
 
Generally speaking, the higher a country’s level of income, the higher its expected governance score, 
since higher income countries have the financial resources necessary to build effective economic and 
political institutions.  Figure 2 shows the simple relationship between per capita income and governance 
scores, with the very clear evidence that the lowest governance scores are among the poorest countries, 
and the highest scores are among the richer ones.  If donor agencies simply used raw governance scores 
to allocate aid, they would systematically eliminate some of the poorest countries of the world that may 
have a low score relative to the rest of the world, but may have a strong score relative to other countries 
with similar income.  Both the original Burnside-Dollar and Collier-Dollar studies found that aid 
worked best in countries with better governance, after controlling for levels of income.   
 
To capture this effect, I first estimate a simple relationship between governance and income levels for 
all countries in the world for which data are available.  As is evident from Figure 2, governance scores 
rise quickly as income increases at low levels of income, and rise more slowly as income levels rise.  To 




G = α - β * е
(-GNP/δ) 
 
Where G is a country's composite governance score, GNP is its per capita income (measured at 
purchasing power parity), е is the base of the natural logarithm, and α, β, and δ are the estimated 
parameters.   α is the estimated maximum governance score (that is, the horizontal asymptote of the 
function), α-β is the y intercept (or the estimated governance score for the hypothetical country with 
zero income), and δ is the speed of convergence (or degree of curvature) of the function.  Figure 2 
shows the estimated curve.  The regression results are shown in Table 2.  The estimated maximum 
governance score is 2.21 (the actual highest score is Finland at 1.94), and the estimated y intercept is –
1.02.  The estimation results are quite good, with the function explaining about 78% of the variation of 
governance scores. 
 
The path of the curve provides the expected (or normal) governance score for a country, given its level 
of income.  Thus, a country's vertical distance above or below the curve gives its governance score 
                                                 
11 The data and supporting documents can be found at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002/index.html 
12 Thanks to David Roodman for suggesting this functional form.   21
controlling for its level of income.  A country falling right on the curve would have a score of zero, 
implying that it has exactly the expected governance score for that level of income.  A country above the 
curve would have a positive score, indicating better than expected governance, while a country falli ng 
below the curve would have a negative score, indicating worse than expected governance.  Table 3 
shows each ODA and OA recipient ranked by their 2002 governance score after controlling for its 
income level.  Chile, Mongolia, and Madagascar top the list, with their controlled governance score 
about one unit above the predicted level for their income.
13  On the other end of the scale are Belarus, 
Argentina, and Turkmenistan, each of which has a governance score about one unit below the norm for 
their income level. 
                                                 
13 The units here are in standard deviations of the distribution of the governance scores, as calculated by Kaufmann and 
Kraay.  Recall that under their methodology, a score of one denoted one standard deviation above the world median (scored 
at zero), whereas negative one denoted one standard deviation below the global median.   22
 
Table 1. ODA Disbursements from DAC Countries             
                      
  $ million  Per cent change 2001-2002  Per cent of GNI 
  2001  2002  2002  national U.S.   volume  1987-1991 1992-1996200020012002
  actual 
a  actual
 a  volume 
b  currency  dollars terms 
b   average  average          
  (a) (b) (c) (d)  (e)  (f) (g)  (h)  (i)  (j)  (k) 
Australia   873   989  916  7.8  13.3  4.9  0.38  0.33 0.27 0.25 0.26 
Austria   533   520  488  -7.3  -2.4  -8.4  0.18  0.18 0.23 0.29 0.26 
Belgium   867  1 072  996  17.4  23.6  14.8  0.44  0.36 0.36 0.37 0.43 
Canada  1 533  2 006  2 011  32.7  30.9  31.2  0.46  0.41 0.25 0.22 0.28 
Denmark  1 634  1 643  1 540  -4.7  0.5  -5.8  0.92  1.02 1.06 1.03 0.96 
Finland   389   462  434  12.9  18.8  11.5  0.65  0.40 0.31 0.32 0.35 
France  4 198  5 486  5 125  24.2  30.7  22.1  0.60  0.58 0.32 0.32 0.38 
Germany  4 990  5 324  4 980  1.4  6.7  -0.2  0.40  0.33 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Greece (c)   202   276  253  30.2  37.0  25.5  ..  0.15 0.20 0.17 0.21 
Ireland   287   398  360  31.9  38.8  25.7  0.18  0.25 0.29 0.33 0.40 
Italy  1 627  2 332  2 157  36.2  43.3  32.6  0.35  0.25 0.13 0.15 0.20 
Japan  9 847  9 283  9 731  -2.9  -5.7  -1.2  0.31  0.26 0.28 0.23 0.23 
Luxembourg   139   147  139  0.4  5.6  0.2  0.23  0.37 0.71 0.76 0.77 
Netherlands  3 172  3 338  3 068  0.0  5.2  -3.3  0.93  0.81 0.84 0.82 0.81 
New Zealand   112   122  110  -0.9  9.1  -1.1  0.24  0.23 0.25 0.25 0.22 
Norway  1 346  1 696  1 517  11.9  26.0  12.7  1.12  0.97 0.76 0.80 0.89 
Portugal   268   323  293  14.2  20.2  9.2  0.23  0.28 0.26 0.25 0.27 
Spain  1 737  1 712  1 559  -6.3  -1.4  -10.3  0.16  0.25 0.22 0.30 0.26 
Sweden  1 666  1 991  1 848  12.4  19.5  10.9  0.90  0.91 0.80 0.77 0.83 
Switzerland   908   939  863  -4.6  3.4  -5.0  0.32  0.36 0.34 0.34 0.32 
United Kingdom  4 579  4 924  4 581  3.2  7.5  0.0  0.30  0.30 0.32 0.32 0.31 
United States  11 429  13 290  13 140  16.3  16.3  15.0  0.19  0.14 0.10 0.11 0.13 
                      
TOTAL DAC  52 335  58 274  56 109  8.5  11.3  7.2   0.33  0.29 0.22 0.22 0.23 
of which:                   
EU Members  26 288  29 949  27 821  8.4  13.9  5.8  0.44  0.40 0.32 0.33 0.35 
                      
a) At current prices and exchange rates.                  
b) At 2001 prices and exchange rates.                  
 































































Note: All ODA/OA recipient countries are included, except those with populations under 1 million. There are 119 countries included in 
1996 and 117 in 2002. The figures shown are simple (unweighted) averages across countries. Low-income countries have GDP per 
capita below the IDA cutoffs for 1996 and 2002, which were $1505 and $1415, respectively. Within each income group, countries are 
divided into the top, middle and bottom thirds of their governance scores, after controlling for income, as described in the Appendix. 
 













Figure 1: Aid Allocations, Income and Governance, 1996 and 2002 Average ODA/OA receipts per capita (constant 2002 dollars) 
  
Table 2: The Estimated Income/Governance Relationship 
 
The estimated relationship is: 
 
G = α - β * е
(-GNP/δ) 
 
G is a country's composite governance score,  
GNP is its per capita income (measured at purchasing power parity)  
е is the base of the natural logarithm 
α, β, and δ are the estimated parameters    
α is the estimated maximum governance score (that is, the horizontal asymptote of the 
function) 
α-β is the y intercept (or the estimated governance score for the hypothetical country 
with zero income) 
δ is the speed of convergence (or degree of curvature) of the function.   
 
 
    Number of obs 159
   R-squared 0.78
     
Parameter Coefficient  Std.  Err.  t-value 
     
α  2.21 0.36 6.1 
β  3.23 0.32  10.1 
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Actual Governance Score Predicted Governance Score
Sources: Governance scores, from www.worl dbank.org/wbi/governance//govdata2002/index.html; income data from World Development Indicators, 2003; 
and author's calculations.
  
Table 3. Governance and Income 
           
    
Country 
PPP GDP per
capita, 2001KK score, 2002
Predicted KK 
score Deviation
           
    
Chile 9190 1.28 0.29 0.99
Mongolia 1740 0.21 -0.72 0.93
Madagascar 830 -0.07 -0.88 0.80
Dominica 5520 0.65 -0.15 0.80
Botswana 7820 0.77 0.14 0.64
St. Vincent and the Grenadines  5330 0.42 -0.18 0.60
Senegal 1500 -0.16 -0.76 0.60
Mauritania 1990 -0.08 -0.68 0.60
Benin 980 -0.26 -0.85 0.59
St. Lucia  5260 0.37 -0.19 0.56
Estonia 10170 0.94 0.40 0.54
Mali 810 -0.35 -0.88 0.53
Burkina Faso  1120 -0.31 -0.83 0.52
Latvia 7730 0.64 0.12 0.51
Malawi 570 -0.42 -0.92 0.50
Grenada 6740 0.50 0.00 0.50
Uruguay 8400 0.70 0.20 0.50
Costa Rica  9460 0.81 0.32 0.49
Ghana 2250 -0.16 -0.64 0.48
Lithuania 8470 0.69 0.21 0.48
Malta 13160 1.16 0.68 0.48
Mozambique 1140 -0.40 -0.82 0.42
Lesotho 2420 -0.21 -0.61 0.40
Tanzania 520 -0.54 -0.93 0.40
Jamaica 3720 -0.03 -0.41 0.38
Morocco 3600 -0.05 -0.43 0.38
Jordan 3870 -0.01 -0.39 0.38
Sri Lanka  3180 -0.12 -0.49 0.37
Poland 9450 0.69 0.32 0.37
Cape Verde  5570 0.22 -0.15 0.37
Barbados 15560 1.24 0.87 0.36
India 2840 -0.19 -0.54 0.36
Belize 5690 0.22 -0.13 0.35
Hungary 12340 0.96 0.61 0.35
Singapore 22680 1.67 1.32 0.35
Mauritius 9860 0.70 0.36 0.34
Zambia 780 -0.57 -0.89 0.31
Thailand 6400 0.25 -0.04 0.29
Antigua and Barbuda  10170 0.68 0.40 0.29
Panama 5750 0.16 -0.12 0.29
Namibia 7120 0.32 0.05 0.26
Bolivia 2300 -0.38 -0.63 0.25
Bulgaria 6890 0.26 0.02 0.24
Niger 890 -0.64 -0.87 0.23
Moldova 2150 -0.43 -0.65 0.22
Vanuatu 3190 -0.27 -0.49 0.22
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Country 
PPP GDP per 
capita, 2001 KK score, 2002
Predicted KK 
score Deviation
           
    
Fiji 4850 -0.03 -0.25 0.21
Malaysia 8750 0.45 0.24 0.21
Vietnam 2070 -0.48 -0.67 0.18
Philippines 3840 -0.22 -0.39 0.17
Armenia 2650 -0.40 -0.57 0.17
Tunisia 6390 0.11 -0.04 0.15
Gambia, The  2050 -0.53 -0.67 0.14
Nepal 1310 -0.66 -0.79 0.13
Romania 5830 0.01 -0.11 0.12
Eritrea 1030 -0.73 -0.84 0.11
Cambodia 1860 -0.59 -0.70 0.11
Egypt, Arab Rep.  3520 -0.37 -0.44 0.07
Peru 4570 -0.22 -0.29 0.07
Slovak Republic  11960 0.63 0.57 0.06
Trinidad and Tobago  9100 0.34 0.28 0.06
Honduras 2830 -0.49 -0.55 0.05
Ethiopia 810 -0.84 -0.88 0.05
Kenya 980 -0.81 -0.85 0.04
Uganda 1490 -0.74 -0.76 0.03
China 4020 -0.34 -0.37 0.03
Guyana 4690 -0.25 -0.27 0.02
Guinea-Bissau 970 -0.84 -0.85 0.01
Comoros 1870 -0.69 -0.70 0.01
Togo 1650 -0.72 -0.74 0.01
El Salvador  5260 -0.18 -0.19 0.01
Czech Republic  14720 0.81 0.81 0.00
Croatia 9170 0.29 0.29 0.00
Slovenia 17130 0.99 0.99 0.00
Bangladesh 1610 -0.78 -0.74 -0.03
Solomon Islands  1910 -0.75 -0.69 -0.05
Yemen, Rep.  790 -0.94 -0.88 -0.05
Papua New Guinea  2570 -0.64 -0.59 -0.06
Brazil 7360 0.02 0.08 -0.06
Mexico 8430 0.13 0.21 -0.08
Djibouti 2370 -0.71 -0.62 -0.09
Lebanon 4170 -0.44 -0.34 -0.09
Albania 3680 -0.52 -0.42 -0.10
Swaziland 4330 -0.43 -0.32 -0.11
South Africa  11290 0.39 0.51 -0.12
Pakistan 1890 -0.84 -0.70 -0.15
St. Kitts and Nevis  11300 0.35 0.51 -0.15
Turkey 5890 -0.26 -0.11 -0.16
Korea, Rep.  15090 0.67 0.84 -0.17
Ecuador 3280 -0.66 -0.48 -0.18
Syrian Arab Republic  3280 -0.66 -0.48 -0.18
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Country 
PPP GDP per capita,
2001 KK score, 2002 Predicted KK score Deviation
           
    
Gabon 5990 -0.28 -0.09 -0.19
Dominican Republic  7020 -0.17 0.04 -0.21
Rwanda 1250 -1.02 -0.80 -0.21
Guatemala 4400 -0.53 -0.31 -0.22
Sierra Leone  470 -1.16 -0.94 -0.22
Chad 1070 -1.09 -0.84 -0.25
Hong Kong, China  24850 1.16 1.42 -0.27
Ukraine 4350 -0.59 -0.32 -0.28
Lao PDR  1620 -1.03 -0.74 -0.29
Kyrgyz Republic  2750 -0.85 -0.56 -0.29
Guinea 1960 -0.99 -0.69 -0.30
Indonesia 2940 -0.84 -0.53 -0.32
Nigeria 850 -1.20 -0.87 -0.32
Central African Republic  1300 -1.13 -0.80 -0.33
Cote d'Ivoire  1490 -1.10 -0.76 -0.34
Congo, Rep.  970 -1.19 -0.85 -0.34
Tajikistan 1170 -1.17 -0.82 -0.35
Cyprus 21190 0.88 1.24 -0.36
Bahrain 16060 0.53 0.91 -0.38
Macedonia, FYR  6110 -0.48 -0.08 -0.40
Georgia 2560 -1.00 -0.59 -0.41
Azerbaijan 3090 -0.96 -0.50 -0.45
Burundi 690 -1.40 -0.90 -0.49
Russian Federation  7100 -0.55 0.05 -0.60
Israel 19790 0.56 1.16 -0.60
Uzbekistan 2460 -1.22 -0.60 -0.62
Iran, Islamic Rep.  6000 -0.73 -0.09 -0.64
Bosnia and Herzegovina  5970 -0.73 -0.09 -0.64
Kazakhstan 6500 -0.67 -0.03 -0.64
Angola 2040 -1.36 -0.67 -0.69
Haiti 1860 -1.40 -0.70 -0.70
Colombia 7040 -0.66 0.04 -0.70
Zimbabwe 2280 -1.34 -0.63 -0.71
Sudan 1970 -1.40 -0.68 -0.71
Kuwait 18700 0.36 1.09 -0.73
Algeria 6090 -0.81 -0.08 -0.73
Macao, China  21630 0.53 1.26 -0.73
Venezuela, RB  5670 -0.88 -0.13 -0.74
Saudi Arabia  13330 -0.05 0.69 -0.75
Paraguay 5210 -1.01 -0.20 -0.81
Congo, Dem. Rep.  680 -1.82 -0.90 -0.91
Turkmenistan 4320 -1.30 -0.32 -0.98
Argentina 11320 -0.58 0.51 -1.08
Belarus 7620 -0.98 0.11 -1.09
           
    
Sources: Governance scores, from www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance//govdata2002/index.html; income data from 
World Development Indicators, 2003; and author's calculations. 
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